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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
UTAH FARM PRODUCTION 
CREDIT ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
COX, JEFFREY J. and ELLIOTT J. 
a co-partnership, ELLIOTT J. 
COX, JEFFREY J. COX, YVONNE 
COX, BLANCHE COX, UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICAN, TRACY-COLLINS BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF 
EPHRAIM 
Defendant-Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No.~/te8'?5 
In several particulars the respondents' statement of facts 
is in error and is misstated. These misstatements will be referred 
to in particular under the appropriate points that follow. 
For clarification, appellant will be referred to as PCA 
(Utah Farm Production Credit Association), and respondents as 
borrowers. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT THEY MITIGATED DAMAGES 
AS REQUIRED BY LAW 
Both parties agree that, under the law, lost profits are 
not recoverable by the borrowers unless they were unable to obtain 
a loan elsewhere. This is because lost profits represent special 
damages and only general damages (the increased interest expense) 
are recoverable when an alternate loan is available. This is 
because there are no special damages when an alternate loan is 
obtained. 
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The borrowers failed to show that they were unable to 
obtain a loan elsewhere. It is undisputed that alternate financing 
was available from other sources including the Moroni Feed Company. 
(Transcript 106, 121, 136 - 138) The borrowers testified that they ' 
absolutely could have obtained financing for 1977 from the Moroni 
Feed Company. (Transcript 136) 
One of the borrowers' own witnesses testified that there 
are other sources of financing besides PCA and that some growers ~ 
are financed through a finance company such as a bank or a lending 
company. (Transcript 186) The borrowers borrowed some money for 
their turkey operation from the Bank of Ephraim in 1977. 
(Transcript 101 - 102) The party who purchased the turkeys from the 
borrowers found financing through the 70-30 Program. (Transcript 
106 - 107) In 1976 the borrowers got financing from the Moroni 
Feed Company. (Transcript 64 - 65) So alternate financing was 
available. 
Borrowers would excuse the fact that they did not even 11·.: 
attempt to get available alternate financing because they had a 
prior delinquency with PCA and PCA had threatened to foreclose. 
That is no excuse because (1) it was entirely the borrowers' fault, 
rather than PCA, that the borrowers were delinquent and in that 
position, and they should not be allowed to benefit from their own 
wrong, and (2) the borrowers could have obtained a loan to finance 
current operations and to refinance the delinquency, thereby 
preventing any possibility of a foreclosure. At least they had a 
duty to make a reasonable attempt to get such financing. But they 
did not even try even though the Moroni F~b~ ~-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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made such loans in the past for current operations and past 
delinquency. (Transcript 137) 
So, the borrowers' conclusion that prospects were poor for 
obtaining a loan is not supported by the record. In actuality, the 
record is to the contrary. The testimony was that Moroni Feed 
Company had made loans in the past for current operations and past 
delinquencies, but that the borrowers made no application in this 
case and, therefore, do not know whether such a loan was available. 
(Transcript 137) Having failed to even make application for the 
necessary loan, the borrowers are precluded as a matter of law from 
being awarded any damages for lost profits. This is because there 
would have been no lost profits if the borrowers had taken 
advantage of available alternate financing. 
The borrowers knew any foreclosure action could be 
prevented through refinancing with another lender. They also knew 
that even if refinancing proved unavailable that any foreclosure 
could not be completed during the growing year with the borrowers' 
rights of redemption and other rights. When the threat of 
foreclosure was made, the response of the borrowers was that they 
would bring suit to prevent the foreclosure. (Transcript 105) So 
borrowers' excuse for not even attempting to get alternate 
financing (imminent foreclosure) is only an excuse. 
The borrowers had plenty of time to obtain alternate 
financing. Even if that had failed, all the borrowers had to do to 
get the loan from PCA was pledge the stock of Elliott Cox, one of 
the responents, in the Moroni Coal Company. (Transcript 102 - 103) 
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Even if not obligated contractually to do so, that was their duty 
under the doctrine of mitigation. It was a duty that created no 
burden because Elliott Cox was already personally liable on the 
note and thus his stock was already indirectly pledged. (Transcript 
288) Consequently, it would have been reasonable for the borrowers 
to have mitigated damages by pledging the stock. Having failed to 
mitigate in this regard and more particularly in regard to 
obtaining alternate financing, the damages must be denied as a 
matter of law. 
The borrowers claim to have mitigated damages by selling 
the 20,000 turkeys and canceling the order for 40,000 and not 
incurring further expense. However, PCA did not get credit for that 
claimed mitigation nor for the 20 cents per poult that borrowers 
received when they sold the poults. Furthermore, the law states what 
mitigation is required in the case of loan commitments and the 
mitigation must take the form of an attempt to get an alternate 
loan. Cox Corp. v. Duggar, 583 P. 2d 19 6 (Utah 197 8) • Therefore, the 
borrowers failed to mitigate as required by law. 
Borrowers' brief does not even attempt to counter the 
argument by PCA that the work by one of the borrowers at Moroni Coal 
Company, after financing with PCA failed, resulted in profits to 
that company. 
that company and the borrowers because they owned at least 47% of 
(Transcript f: PCA was not credited with that benefit. 
163) Consequently, the borrowers are getting a benefit which they 
would not have received if they had remained in the turkey business 
because Jeff Cox, one of the borrowers, would have been running the 
turkey operation rather than generating :i:::'::,:.========= al 
I• \ 
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Company. PCA was not credited with that benefit. 
Even the limited credit that PCA was given was inaccurately 
calculated. Cox testified that he went to work for the Moroni Coal 
Company in the beginning of April, 1977, for the sum of $200.00 per 
week (in addition to the profit to the borrowers' stock in Moroni 
Coal Company as a result of his work). (Transcript 139, 141) 
Accordingly, the trial court gave PCA credit for $7200.00 
representing 36 weeks at $200.00 per week. 
Borrowers claim that the calculation was correct because 
the first of April was a Friday and, therefore, Cox went to work at 
the coal company on Monday, April 4. Borrowers claim that this 
meant that he worked 36 weeks plus 3 days if holidays were not con-
sidered. That is incorrect. There was nothing in the record to 
show that Cox did not get $200.00 in a week where there was a 
I 
holiday. Furthermore, there were 13 weeks prior to Monday, April 
I 
~ 
4. This leaves 39 weeks for the rest of the year. At $200.00 per 
week, for 39 weeks ($200 x 39 = $8,000.00), the credit should have 
been $8,000.00, rather than $7200.00 representing an $800.00 error. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW ANY CONDUCT ON THE PART 
OF THE APPELLANT CREATING APPARENT AUTHORITY IN THE LOAN OFFICER 
Both the parties agree that the loan officer did not have 
I 
express or implied authority to make a loan commitment. The loan 
I 
was never approved by the loan committee as required. The borrowers 
j 
~laim that PCA's loan officer had apparent authority. The theory of 
the borrowers is that PCA failed to act where there was a duty to 
~ct, such that it led the borrowers to believe that the agent had 
~uthority to make the loan commitment. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Borrowers fail to show what the inaction was or that there 
was a duty. Borrowers reference to the record to support the 
conclusion that the loan officer had authority is Finding of Fact 
18, which is nothing more than a conclusory statement that the 
agent had authority. There is nothing in the record to support 
that finding. 
The only suggestion by the borrowers of PCA's failure to 
act when it had a duty to act was that (1) the borrowers were not 
aware that the loan officer had no authority and thought his 
commitment was final, (2) borrowers past experience was that the 
loan officer approved the loan, and (3) PCA was aware of its 
agent's practices of committing loans before final approval and 
never informed the borrowers that such approvals were not binding. 
In response to number (1), just because the borrowers 
mistakingly concluded that the loan officer had authority does not 
mean that he had authority or that PCA had a duty to inform the 
borrowers of their mistaken conclusion. There is nothing in the 
record to show that PCA knew that the borrowers were acting under 
erroneous information. In fact, the record is to the contrary. 
Borrowers knew that loan committee approval was required. 
(Transcript 118 -119) 
The same is true in response to (2). The borrowers just 
assumed that it was the loan officer himself who had approved loans 
in the past. Such was not the case. The loan officer was merely 
telling the borrowers what the loan committee had done. Again, the 
borrowers had mistakingly concluded something but they failed to 
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show that PCA caused their mistaken conclusion and thereby had a 
duty to correct it for them. 
The only reason for the borrowers' conclusion was that in 
the past when the loan officer made his commitment, the borrowers 
eventually got the loan. That was only because it had been 
previously approved by the loan committee. 
Actually, it is apparent that the borrowers knew that 
. loan committee approval was required because their testimony was 
that in the past the loan officer had told them that the loan 
, committee had already approved the loan. (Transcript 118) Later on 
i 
they testified that they had been told that a prior loan had been 
approved by the loan committee. (Transcript 119) So borrowers did 
not really believe that the loan officer had authority to approve 
~ 
the loan. 
The borrowers said that in prior loans that when the loan 
I 
officer had told them that something would be done, it was always 
done and that the loan officer's commitment was good enough for 
~ 
them. (Transcript 119) That did not mean that it did not require 
~ 
loan committee approval or that they did not know of such. The 
borrowers admitted that they did not know whether the loan officer 
actually had authority. (Transcript 119 -120) 
In response to (3), the borrowers cite the transcript at 
-
pages 252, 308 and 322 in support of the conclusion that PCA was 
-
aware of the loan officer's practices of committing loans before 
~ final approval. Page 252 does not say that. It says that loan 
~ 
committee approval was necessary and that there may have been cases 
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where the loan officer took it upon himself to do certain things, 
but they were not complying with company policy. The witness did 
not say what those certain things were and he only said that may 
have been the case. He did not say that PCA knew of any such 
practice, assuming such was the practice. Nor did he say that 
these borrowers had been mislead by any such practice. In fact, 
the borrowers own witness testified that the borrowers were not 
told of approval until the loan committee had approved a loan. 
(Transcript 320) 
Page 308 only says that loans are committed before all the · 
paper work was done. It does not say that loan officers were 
committing loans to borrowers before the loan committees' approval. 
A loan can be given final approval by the loan committee before all 
the paper work is done. (Transcript 250, 285) 
Even if a loan officer was giving a commitment before loan 
committee approval, there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
these borrowers were misled. In the instance referred to, 
involving a different party, that party may have been misinformed, 
but that had no bearing on the respondents. Even in that unrelated 
instance, the application had been taken to the loan committee 
before a commitment was given and the loan officer knew that the 
loan committee had verbally approved the loan, even though all the 
paper work had not been completed. (Transcript 310) In that case 
the loan officer thought that the loan committee had signed the 
papers before telling the borrower of approval. (Transcript 311, 
312) 
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Page 322 only says that some growers were allowed to take 
delivery of their poults while the loan application was pending. It 
says nothing in support of the conclusion that PCA was aware of an 
agent's practice of committing loans before final approval. So 
there was no inaction by PCA where there was a duty to act and 
consequently no apparent authority. 
The law requires that PCA, rather than the loan officer, 
give the borrowers the mistaken impression they had. Malia v. 
Giles, 114 P.2d 208; (Utah 1941); Bank of Salt Lake v. 
Corporation of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints, 534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975). The borrowers did not show any 
, way in which PCA created any such situation, thereby giving a duty 
to correct the borrowers' mistaken conclusion. Furthermore, it 
does not appear from the record that the borrowers were honestly 
mistaken. They knew loan committee approval was required. 
(Transcript 118-119) 
The other authority of law cited by the borrowers in 
support of their conclusion that the loan officer had apparent 
i 
authority is the Restatement of Agency to the effect that third 
persons who are aware of what a continuously employed agent has 
done, are normally entitled to believe that he will continue to 
have such authority until the third person has been notified that 
& 
the agent is no longer authorized. In the case at bar, the 
~ 
borrowers did not even believe that the loan officer could make a 
commitment without loan committee approval. (Transcript 118 - 119) 
'Consequently, the borrowers could not have believed that the loan 
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officer would continue to have authority that they never believed 
he had. Nor could authority continue that the officer never 
actually had. 
THE RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE AGREEMENT 
IS NOT VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The trial court made no finding as to the time within 
which the loan was to be repaid. The borrowers claim that it was 
not necessarily more than a year because of some generalizations 
made by their witness at the trial that it was to be paid 
approximately a year after the note would have been executed 
because it had been done that way in the past. Even the borrowers' 
testimony leaves it within the Statute. That testimony was that 
the note would have been written from January 1 to January 1. 
(Transcript 128) That is a contract that by its terms would not be 
performed within one year. January 1 to January 1 is more than one 
year by one day and hence within the Statute of Frauds. 
In reality the loans had never been paid one year after 
the note was executed. They had always matured on the sixth day of 
the next month after the anniversary of the note. The only party 
that really knew when repayment would have been required testified 
that if the loan was committed in January of 1977, which the 
borrowers claim it was, then it would have been due by its terms on 
February 6, 1978. (Transcript 122-3, 127,130, 270-271A) 
Actually the evidence was that there were to be two loans. 
These included the one just referred to and another loan for seven 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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years payable in seven installments. (Transcript 129 - 130, 234, 
240, 249) The second loan was to refinance the past delinquency 
and the other loan was for 1977 operating expenses. There was more 
than a dicussion about the seven year loan. It was the way the 
past delinquency was going to be refinanced. (Transcript 129-130, 
249) So both the alleged commitments are void under the Statute. 
Even if only one of the loans is unenforceable under the 
Statute of Frauds, that would defeat borrowers' entire case because 
they needed both loans. 
Borrowers claim that if an oral contract that is other-
1wise within the Statute of Frauds can be performed within one year, 
.that takes the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. The 
authorities cited by the borrowers are not on point. They do not 
1involve cases where the terms of the contract provide for payment 
.in excess of one year. Where the terms of the contract provide for 
payment over a period that exceeds one year, then it must be in 
writing. The Statute says: 
! 
"In the following cases every agreement shall be 
void unless such agreement, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to 
be performed within one year from the making 
thereof." (Emphasis added) 
!In the case at bar, the terms of the verbal contract provided for 
payment to be made more than one year after the loan. That was 
dtrue of both loans. 
Promissory Estoppel does not take the case out of the 
Statute of Frauds because the. promise was not as to an existing Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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fact as required under the case of Ravarino v. Price cited by the 
borrowers. If there was a promise, it was to make a loan in the 
future and therefore the doctrine of promissory estoppel is 
inapplicable under the law of that case. 
RESPONDENTS BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT THEY DID PROVE DAMAGES WITH 
REASONABLE CERTAINTY 
Respondents Failed to Show That it Was Reasonably Certain That 
They Could Have Acquired the Last 40,000 Poults 
It is not reasonably certain that the borrowers could have 
acquired the last 40,000 poults. Just because PCA figured the 
budget on the assumption that the poults could be delivered does 
not mean that it was proven with reasonable certainty that the 
poults would have been delivered as claimed by borrowers. 
Borrowers misstate the evidence on page 12 of their brief 
when they say that the hatchery manager stated that the 40,000 
poults would have been delivered. The answer was that they 
"probably" could have been delivered. (Transcript 176) The law 
requires more than probability. It requires reasonable certainty 
and the answer of probability is insufficient to meet their burden 
of proof. The manager testified that respondents would have been a 
second priority customer because they were not paying cash and, 
therefore, whether the poults would have been available would have 
been at the option of the Board of Directors. (Transcript 177) 
Therefore, it was not reasonably certain as required by law. 
Borrowers said that no evidence was introduced to the 
effect that the seller would not have been able to deliver the 
poults. The borrowers seek to shift the burdAn nP nrnnP hv m~~tng Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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such a statement. It was the borrowers' burden to prove that they 
could have acquired the 40,000 poults from which to make a profit. 
They failed to show reasonable certainty as required by law. This 
error, in and of itself, reduces the lost profit award by two-
thirds since 40,000 poults represents two-thirds of the turkeys. 
Respondents Failed to Sustain Their Burden in Proving That 
a Dividend From the Moroni Feed Company Was Not Speculative 
Borrowers say that the testimony at trial made it clear 
that the receipt of the retains was not speculative, citing pages 
88-90 of the transcript. That portion of the transcript does not 
support the borrowers' conclusion. It merely says that the 
borrowers had a buyer for the retains. That does not mean that it 
is reasonably certain that the Moroni Feed Company will be able to 
pay the dividend in 1982. 
Borrowers say that the dividend will be paid in 1982 
because the feed company is on firm financial standing. There is 
; nothing in the transcript to support that conclusion. 
Borrowers say that no evidence was introduced that Moroni 
tFeed Company had ever failed to pay the retains in the past. Again 
~: the borrowers seek to shift the burden of proof by making such a 
1 statement. It was the borrowers' burden to prove with reasonable 
• certainty that the feed company will be able to pay the dividend 
in 1982. Again, they failed. That error, in and of itself, amounts 
to $28,940.40. (Transcript 330) 
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Respondents Fail to Show That They Proved They Were Average 
Turkey Growers · 
There is absolutely nothing in the record to support the 
claim by the borrowers that they proved that they were average and 
that, therefore, their damage would have been the same as an 
average grower. The only testimony at trial was not what the 
borrowers would have earned if given the loan, but what the average 
grower would have earned. In fact, at the trial the Court sustained 
appellants' objection as to what these particular borrowers would 
have earned in 1977. The witness was only allowed to testify as to 
what the average grower earned and not as to these borrowers 
because there was no link in the evidence that they were average. 
(Transcript 200) 
The fact that borrowers were in the business for eleven 
years does not mean that they were average. The fact that there may 
have been some profits in some prior years does not mean that they 
were average. The average grower may have made much greater profits 
of these borrowers, assuming there were any. Furthermore, the 
borrowers testified that they really did not know what profits 
there were. (Transcript 152 - 153) 
Again the borrowers seek to shift the burden of proof by 
saying that there was no evidence that borrowers lost money during 
any year that another grower made money. It was the borrowers' 
burden to prove that they were average. They failed to do so. The 
only evidence in the record was the tax returns which showed 
~ 
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nothing but losses. (Exhibits 31-34 and Transcript 158, 166-167). 
The borrowers claim they were at least average because 
they grew heavier turkeys than average. That proves nothing 
because it costs more to grow heavier turkeys. The borrowers were 
not awarded damages for heavier turkeys because they failed to 
prove the extra cost. (Transcript 204, 209) Without knowing the 
extra costs that would be spent by the borrowers, compared to the 
extra cost for the average grower, it cannot be determined if the 
borrowers were average. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF FAILS TO SHOW THAT THEY HAD A BUSINESS HISTORY THAT 
WOULD JUSTIFY DAMAGES 
Borrowers say that there was no evidence as to what amount 
of money the turkey operation lost during previous years and, 
therefore, the business history does not preclude an award of 
damages. That conclusion is erroneous. The issue is not how much 
'was lost, but whether there had been losses and whether there was a 
t history of successful operation. Since there was no evidence of 
successful business operation, the damages must be denied. That was 
their burden. The only evidence was the testimony and tax returns 
of the borrowers which show only losses. (Exhibits 31-34, 
: Transcript 158, 166-167) 
r; The record at page 219 and 322, does not support the 
conclusion of the borrowers that if they had done poorly during the 
previous four years it was because the industry did poorly. 
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Again borrowers seek to shift the burden of proof by 
stating that there is no evidence that other growers made a profit 
during those years. It is not PCA's burden to show that other 
growers made a profit and only borrowers had a loss, nor is it 
PCA's burden to offer evidence to indicate that the borrowers' 
operation would not have realized the profits found by the Court as 
suggested by the borrowers in their brief. Furthermore, that is 
not the issue. The law requires proof of successful business 
history. The borrowers have failed to show a successful business 
history because such was not the case, and their damages must also 
fail. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR THE APPEAL 
Even if the case is not reversed, appellant is entitled to 
$10,998.50 in attorney's fees. If the case is reversed, the fee 
should be $15,000.00, plus an additonal $5,000.00 for the appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be unjust to allow the $44,927.60 counterclaim to 
be affirmed. That award reduced the amount which PCA was repaid on 
a loan made to the borrowers and, therefore, it represents a loss 
of real money actually delivered to the borrowers in connection 
with a previous loan. 
It is necessary to examine what both parties did or failed 
to do that entitles the borrowers to save $44,927.60. All PCA did 
was make a promise to loan money. (PCA denies that any such 
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promise was made, but that finding is not challenged on appeal 
because there is the testimony of the borrowers claiming a verbal 
loan commitment). That is all PCA did to lose $44,927.60. All the 
'borrowers did to receive $44,927.60, was to implicity agree to 
repay the loan. (Actually there was nothing in the record to show 
tthat they ever promised to repay it, but apparently the Court has 
:assumed such). They did nothing else. 
Once the promise was made to loan the money and to repay 
~it, the borrowers, after not receiving the loan, engaged in other 
ibusiness ventures including the Moroni Coal Company. That company 
was owned by the borrowers, at least to the extent of forty-seven 
percent (47%). One of the borrowers, Jeff Cox, went to work full 
time for the coal company after the loan failed, and he testified 
~ 
that his return was likely to have been the cause for a significant 
~ 
increase in profits from the prior year. If there had been a loan, 
l 
he would not have been able to work for the coal company. So the 
borrowers are getting the best of both worlds. They are allowed to 
it liquidate their turkey business without crediting PCA and they are 
~awarded $44,927.60 for doing nothing and they are allowed to pursue 
~other ventures and are not required to give PCA credit for profit 
1 in that enterprise. Such a result is totally inequitable and 
contrary to the law of mitigation. 
~ For the borrowers to be entitled to the $44,927.60, they 
rmust have made a reasonable attempt to get alternate financing. 
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Other financing was available. Since the borrowers failed to even 
attempt to get other financing, they failed to mitigate damages and 
the award of the trial court must be reversed. The fact that PCA 
may have initiated foreclosure proceedings is no excuse because the 
borrowers had a duty to make a reasonable attempt to get financing 
that would have prevented the foreclosure. This had been done in 
the past and there is nothing in the record to show that it could 
not have been done this time. 
It is apparent that the borrowers did not want to stay in 
the turkey business enough to pledge the stock of one of the 
borrowers even though that borrower was already personally 
obligated on the note. This shows their confidence in making 
profits that year. That is another way in which damages could have 
and should have been mitigated. 
Not only is PCA being charged $44,927.60 for simply making 
a promise to loan money, but said promise was by an agent without 
authority. There is no dispute that the loan application exceeded 
the agent's authority. Both parties agree that he had no express 
or implied authority. There is nothing in the record to justify 
any conclusion that he had apparent authority because the borrowers 
knew that loan committee approval was required and because there is 
nothing in the record to show that PCA caused the borrowers to 
believe that the agent had authority. 
To prevent problems presented when opposing parties claim 
·opposite facts, such as whether a loan commitment was made the law 
' 
I& 
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has created a policy in the form of the Statute of Frauds to 
prevent one party from binding another unless the commitment was in 
writing. Under the Statute of this state, the promise to make a 
loan had to be in writing because neither of the loans would have 
been payable under their terms within one year. Without any 
question, one of the loans would have been payable in seven years. 
Without that portion of the loan, the borrowers could not have 
remained in business. The award of $44,927.60 should be reversed 
because it was based on the alleged promise of an unauthorized 
agent and there is no evidence in writing to show that the promise 
was actually made. 
Even if a promise had been made by an authorized agent in 
writing, it is not reasonably certain, as required by law, that 
.~: 
these borrowers would have been able to net a profit of $44,927.60 
or any amount. This is because: 
~ 
1. It was only probable and not reasonably certain that 
~ 
the borrowers could have even acquired the last 40,000 poults from 
-
which to make two-thirds (2/3) of the profit. 
~ 
2. It is not reasonably certain that Moroni Feed Company 
·ii: 
~ will be financially able to pay a dividend in 1982 which represents 
~ 
~ 
-
$28,940.48 of the $44,927.60. 
3. It is not reasonably certain that these particular 
borrowers would have made the same profit as other borrowers if 
they had received the loan. There is absolutely nothing in the 
transcript to support the inference made by the trial court that 
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because the average borrower made a certain net profit, these 
borrowers would have made the same profit. 
To prevent awards of lost profits that would be 
inequitable, in situations similar to this case, the law has 
another policy against awarding them where the -claimant fails to 
show a prior business history of success. Since the prior business 
history of these borrowers showed nothing but losses, it would only 
be fair to deny the award in this case and such a reversal would be 
in conformity with law. 
The ruling of the trial court must be reversed as to the 
counterclaim and PCA should, as a matter of law, be awarded 
$5,000.00 in attorney's fees for this appeal, together with 
attorney's fees at the trial level as requested. 
Respectfully submitted, 
' L)a.oU:L 3. t~~ 
David B. Boyce ) 
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addressed as follows: 
Earl Jay Peck 
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